Russia has several scenarios for an attack on NATO, according to The Telegraph
Western governments have long been warning of the potential threat of a Russian attack on NATO. At the same time, intelligence officials have recently concluded that Vladimir Putin does not seek a direct military confrontation with the Alliance but may be planning hybrid operations against NATO member states. Such actions, in turn, could lead to an unpredictable escalation.
This is one of the most widely discussed scenarios regarding Russia’s actions.
It is believed that Russian agents operating undercover could organize protests over alleged oppression of the Russian-speaking population in cities such as Narva, Estonia, or Daugavpils, Latvia.
Under the cover of these protests, Russian military personnel—initially unmarked and in civilian clothing—could cross the border and attempt to seize control of strategic facilities and cities.
In such a case, NATO would face a difficult question: Is this a full-scale Russian aggression, or is it internal unrest?
Russia could use the lull to deploy troops under the pretext of “peacekeeping.”
At the same time, following the occupation of Crimea in 2014, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been preparing for precisely such a scenario.
“If figures resembling the mysterious Crimean ‘little green men’ of 2014 appear on the streets of Narva, they will simply be shot.”
The worst-case scenario—though also the least likely—is considered to be a full-scale Russian military offensive against neighboring NATO countries.
In such a scenario, Moscow could simultaneously launch an offensive from Kaliningrad and from Belarusian territory, attempting to cut off the Suwalki Corridor—a strategic stretch between Poland and Lithuania.
At the same time, Russian paratroopers or marines could land on the Swedish island of Gotland, which would complicate the supply of NATO forces in the Baltic region.
In such a case, the Baltic states would find themselves partially cut off from the rest of the Alliance.
However, this scenario is also being carefully analyzed by NATO countries.
Security expert Mark Galeotti notes: “If Russian troops cross the border into Estonia, everyone knows what will happen next. The invading Russian forces would come under attack, and NATO aircraft and missiles would be deployed against their rear units.”
Another possibility could be a provocation disguised as an accident.
For example, a Russian helicopter might make an emergency landing near the border with Kaliningrad due to an alleged technical malfunction.
Afterward, Russia could send a “rescue team” into Polish or Lithuanian territory under the pretext of evacuating the crew or ensuring safety.
Other incidents could be staged along the same lines—specifically, missiles or drones that allegedly accidentally cross the border and fall on NATO territory.
“There are countless variations on the ‘lost helicopter’ scenario, including missiles and drones that ‘accidentally’ fly over Ukraine and crash in Poland, Romania, and Moldova. And in recent months, there has been an increase in precisely such ‘accidents.’
Another potential scenario involves a provocation using captured or shot-down Ukrainian drones.
According to the publication, the Kremlin may be stockpiling such UAVs and using them to create the illusion that a Ukrainian attack on Russia allegedly ended with drones crashing on NATO territory.
Poland could be a potential target of such a provocation, where, as The Telegraph notes, anti-Ukrainian sentiment is on the rise.
Such a scenario could be appealing to the Kremlin, as it could exacerbate political divisions within NATO and weaken support for Ukraine.
At the same time, it remains unclear exactly how Russia could use such an incident to significantly undermine the Alliance’s unity.
Russia has already demonstrated its ability to carry out sabotage operations in various European countries.
If the Kremlin wants to test NATO’s readiness to respond, one possible option could be an operation resulting in civilian casualties—for example, sabotage on a railway or an attack on an industrial facility.
At the same time, such actions pose a significant risk to Russia itself. Moscow cannot be certain what level of escalation would force the West to change its policy; therefore, a sabotage operation could trigger not an unwanted political reaction, but a military response.
Cyberattacks against NATO countries could serve as another means of exerting pressure.
In theory, a large-scale cyberattack could be viewed as grounds for invoking the Alliance’s collective defense mechanisms. At the same time, identifying the perpetrators of such an attack is often more difficult than in the case of a traditional military attack.
Russia may attempt to strike at the financial system, transportation infrastructure, or major airports, creating chaos and panic without directly using military force.
The Kremlin may calculate that such actions will not provoke a large-scale response from the West.
At the same time, the speed with which responsibility is established and a response is mounted could become an important deterrent.
“If CIA Director Ratcliffe has made it clear to Russia that the process of establishing responsibility and taking appropriate measures will occur much faster than Russia is accustomed to, ‘this could begin to instill some discipline in their actions.’”
Thus, The Telegraph considers several possible scenarios of Russian aggression against NATO—ranging from hybrid provocations and sabotage to a direct military offensive. At the same time, the publication highlights the Kremlin’s key problem: any operation against Alliance countries could spiral out of control and lead to a larger-scale confrontation.
The Telegraph analyzed possible scenarios of Russian aggression against NATO and the Kremlin’s potential objectives.
Poland remains interested in participating in NATO’s nuclear sharing program. At the same time, Warsaw is negotiating its participation in the planning of a European “nuclear umbrella” proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron.
U.S. President Donald Trump stated that he is not concerned about the possibility of a Russian provocation against one of the NATO countries. He also denied that CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent trip to Moscow was related to warning the Kremlin about the consequences of such an attack.
