Peace in Ukraine is what the vast majority of citizens desire. Yet, judging by the latest rhetoric from both sides, the prospect of ending the war appears to be moving further out of reach.
Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Mikhail Galuzin, recently outlined a new “peace plan” from the Kremlin. Its essence: a temporary United Nations administration is introduced in Ukraine, preparations are made for elections, the elections take place, the government changes, and Moscow then signs a peace treaty with the new administration.
The most striking element is that Russia intends to continue military operations and shelling throughout this entire period. Russia is reportedly willing to suspend fire for only one day (!) during voting. Before, during, and even after (!!) that day, Moscow plans to continue the war—up until the peace treaty is signed.
What is meant by a regime of external administration, why this scenario is not just unacceptable for Ukraine and the world but downright fantastical, and why Russia has returned to this idea? Political analyst Mykyta Trachuk of UA.News investigated the issue.
What is meant by “external administration,” and why this scenario is unrealistic
The Kremlin’s proposal involves discussing a UN-led external administration with the Americans, setting a clear election date, and preparing for the vote. Meanwhile, the war continues. On the day of voting, Russia would make “radical concessions,” providing only a 24-hour ceasefire. Afterward, hostilities would resume until a new “functional” government—according to Russian terminology—signs a peace agreement.
Such ideas are not new. Vladimir Putin made virtually the same proposal at the end of March 2025, citing UN external administration because he did not believe anything could be signed with the current Kyiv government:
“You sign with these ones, but the next will come and cancel everything,” he said at the time.
By “UN external administration,” experts mean the United Nations Transitional Administration (UNTA)—a rare international practice introduced only in extreme circumstances, where states effectively no longer function and a vacuum of authority exists.
Historical examples include Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, East Timor after Indonesian occupation, Kosovo after the Balkan wars, and Papua New Guinea following civil conflict. In each case, these were not fully functioning states, but territories where state institutions had collapsed and anarchy reigned.
Comparing Ukraine to post-war Papua New Guinea or East Timor is inappropriate—even after years of brutal conflict. Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine maintains basic state functions: a president and government, security services and courts, operational transport, postal and communications services, and basic utilities (albeit intermittently).
While the quality of these functions may be questioned, their existence is undeniable. Therefore, the Russian proposal is not just unconstructive—it is fantastical and absurd. It is an “anti-plan.” Even the UN would reject it, as Ukraine exhibits no conditions warranting immediate external administration. In theory and practice, it is impossible.
Furthermore, according to Russian propaganda, Ukraine has already been under some form of “external control” since 2014. Putin repeatedly claimed Kyiv merely followed the will of “overseas masters.” The logic presented by Russia implies Ukraine was always under the “wrong” external administration, and now it is time for the “right” one—a clear reflection of ideological and propagandist motivations.
Why Russia has returned to the idea of external administration
Both sides have recently returned to escalatory rhetoric. President Zelenskyy has expressed dissatisfaction with current security guarantees, reiterated that he will never make territorial concessions, and insisted he would rather not sign a peace deal than sign a bad one. At the Munich Security Conference, he said:
“This is a crazy… war of Russians against just people. And it cannot simply be stopped, because we cannot just stop—it is not what the Russians want. There are some signals from the American side, from President Trump—they say: ‘Listen, now is the time for compromises. You can make some steps forward.’ We have made many compromises. Putin and his friends are not in prison. This is the biggest compromise the world has made so far.”
Both Moscow and Kyiv are simultaneously raising the stakes. Russia is pushing the narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, conflating “legitimacy” with “legality,” and shifting negotiations toward “rebuilding” Ukraine under UN external administration.
This rhetoric also reflects Moscow’s refusal to engage directly with Ukraine’s current leadership, citing the lack of elections and claiming Kyiv is incapable of signing agreements. It further de-subjectivises Ukraine, portraying it as a “territory” incapable of self-governance and in need of international—specifically UN—oversight. With Russia as a permanent UN Security Council member, the Kremlin’s reasoning is clear.
Proposals for external administration signal Russia’s lack of genuine intent to reach peace. Fantastical projects and impossible conditions provide justification for continued war: “We offered terms, they refused—so we keep fighting.”
Paradoxically, both sides “benefit” from this. Outside the American administration and ordinary citizens, no one seems eager for rapid peace. Russia produces increasingly absurd proposals, while Ukraine insists it would rather not sign any peace deal than sign a bad one. Europeans share similar concerns, fearing Russian aggression if Ukraine’s resistance ends.
All sides seem to await a “good peace.” Yet the conditions for this will likely never exist again. Continuing the war increases unpredictable risks for Ukraine, Europe, and Russia alike.
A “good peace” existed before 24 February 2022. A reasonably acceptable agreement could have been signed after Ukraine’s autumn 2022 battlefield successes. Now, in February 2026, the situation has worsened. The window to sign even a “bad peace” has passed. The only options now range from “very bad” to “catastrophic.” There are no foreseeable factors to improve the situation—unless a “black swan” event occurs (e.g., Putin dies, a coup in Russia). Planning state and military policy solely on such improbable events would be unprofessional.
In summary, the current escalation in rhetoric—proposals for “external administration” and similar ideas—reflects a total diplomatic deadlock. Negotiations have no real prospects for compromise, leaving Ukraine as far from peace or even a ceasefire as ever.
