“We’ve passed the point of no return”: Former SAPO Prosecutor Bronevitsky on Kravchenko’s Resignation and the Call Center Mafia

“Instead of experts—idiots and temporary workers; instead of work—pretty pictures generated by artificial intelligence.” Former SAPO prosecutor Stanislav Bronevitsky speaks candidly about why Ukraine’s public administration system is falling apart. On personnel failures, the collapse of the prosecutor’s office, the lack of institutional memory, and why it’s finally time for the authorities to “get out of their comfort zone” and have an adult conversation with society. 

Every week, loud explosions of corruption scandals rock the government: “The Chancellor,” “The Queen,” “Forrest Gump,” and “The Emperor,” who’s on the run somewhere. The Prosecutor General’s Office “protected” the call center industry, which long ago shifted its focus from Russians to citizens of Ukraine and the EU.

According to the NABU and the SAPO, the organization of the scheme is attributed to Prosecutor General’s Office official Serhiy Kropiva (“Chancellor”), and the building of this empire miraculously coincided with the appointment of Ruslan Kravchenko, who was removed from office just a day ago following a vote in the Verkhovna Rada.  

On the personnel disaster, illusory reports for social media, and the point of no return—after which it’s time for the authorities to get out of their “comfort zone” and speak to the country like adults — we spoke once again, and certainly not for the last time, with Stanislav Bronevitsky, former prosecutor at the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (2020–2024) and now an investigator. Below are the lawyer’s direct quotes. 

The Midas Case: A Test of Thousands of Hours of Audio Recordings

This fall marks, first and foremost, the end of the Midas case investigation. The pre-trial investigation period ends on November 10, and by that time, the prosecution must complete its procedural actions and provide the defense with the case materials for review.

This is the first and most important outcome. Why is it so crucial? Because at the start of the Midas investigation, both the leadership of NABU and the leadership of the SAP made a big public fuss about thousands of hours of audio recordings. And now, finally, the defense will have the opportunity to listen to these thousands of hours—not just a few dozen minutes selected at random, but the entire body of conversations.

If this does not happen, if the defense is not provided with everything, it will be a very serious miscalculation on the part of the prosecution. After all, the defense attorneys will quite logically demand the complete recordings. This is precisely the case where NABU and the SAP, through the words of their leaders, have driven themselves into a corner.

The “Carthage” Case: The Purge of the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ternopil Trail

The second important development is the active phase of the “Carthage” case. Here, it is essential to focus specifically on the legal outcome, not the political one.

So far, we have only seen political consequences in the form of the dismissal of Prosecutor General Kravchenko. At the same time, personnel purges are continuing among lower-level and regional officials. First Deputy Prosecutor General Maria Vdovichenko, who oversaw the same areas and “elevators” as Kropiva, is leaving her post. Officials dismissed from the Cherkasy Regional Prosecutor’s Office include Deputy Head Maksym Tompel and his partner Didych, who is also the sister of Chancellor Kropiva. At the Ternopil Tax Service, searches were conducted at the offices of the head and her deputies in connection with a case involving the receipt of unlawful benefits by three companies.

The Ternopil episode is particularly interesting because sources in Carthage-related circles have revealed a former very close relationship between Kravchenko and the head of the Ternopil State Tax Service. The leaked “tapes” contain relevant information, which is why it was no coincidence that NABU detectives conducted searches there.

What Does Society Really Expect from the “Carthage” Case?

If the investigation stops at nothing more than the high-profile resignations of Kravchenko, Vdovichenko, and their inner circle, it will mean one thing: the investigation was launched solely for the sake of a temporary political effect. But the public wants real results in the fight against the black market of fraudulent call centers. Law enforcement must clearly state the total number of such facilities from which officials of the Prosecutor General’s Office collected monthly “tribute,” and reveal the names of the actual owners of this industry. After all, such a network is not just a few people with phones, but huge premises, expensive equipment, an entire hiring system with HR departments, first-contact operators, and the purchase of leaked databases on the black market.

In addition, a large-scale financial infrastructure is involved in the scheme. We’re talking about hundreds of “mules” who provide their bank cards for the transit of stolen funds, banks that pretend not to notice suspicious transactions, financial monitoring agencies, and other law enforcement bodies that have been collecting kickbacks from this business for years.

If the entire crime consisted of prosecutors taking money for “protection,” then these call centers were buying themselves the freedom to operate unhindered. Therefore, law enforcement must not only expose the prosecutorial mafia that profited from the scheme, but to completely dismantle the call center network itself, hold accountable those who transferred money to “Chancellor” Kropiva, and disclose the exact amounts of protection money extorted over the entire period of this organization’s operation. That’s $5.7 million or $10 million. We don’t know the exact amount, but we understand perfectly well that the sums involved are truly colossal. 

It’s not just the OGP: the operation of call centers requires the collusion of all law enforcement agencies

The resources of a single prosecutor’s office are categorically insufficient for the operation of fraudulent call centers. This system must involve banks, the State Financial Monitoring Service, the tax service, and other law enforcement agencies. Absolutely everyone must tacitly give their “approval,” since each of these agencies possesses the full range of tools to instantly stop or block such activities as risky. The tax service, upon observing suspicious activity involving hundreds of sole proprietors with zero tax returns operating out of massive rented offices, is obligated to immediately alert the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The state has every means to identify such schemes at an early stage.

Therefore, the belief that only the prosecutor’s office is involved in this industry is an illusion. The prosecutor’s office only gets involved at the pre-trial investigation stage, once a case has been opened, and prosecutors then inform the “protected” businesses of a specific monthly fee. But to ensure the network isn’t disrupted by constant visits from the National Police, the BEB, or the tax authorities, everyone must be kept in the loop. The reformed BEB, the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR), the police, and, quite likely, the Security Service of Ukraine—all of them were part of this system. The prosecutor’s office, meanwhile, coordinated all of this through its supervisory authority over all law enforcement agencies. It independently decided where to conduct searches and where not to. At Kropiva’s behest, searches were carried out specifically at “undesirable” call centers that refused to pay.

“The Boss Is Watching Me”: Why Kropiva Couldn’t Act Without the Prosecutor General’s Knowledge

Kropiva held the relatively modest position of deputy head of the Department of International Legal Cooperation at the Prosecutor General’s Office. In reality, however, he controlled everything, effectively directing the actions of other law enforcement officers and openly speaking on behalf of the Prosecutor General. Only one person in the country could have granted an official such inappropriate and excessive powers—the Prosecutor General himself.

If Kropiva had acted independently as a “self-appointed official,” the heads of other law enforcement agencies (such as the National Police) would have immediately called the Prosecutor General to complain and demand that he rein in or fire his subordinate. The system is too tightly knit; it’s impossible to conceal operations on this scale. Ruslan Kravchenko, who, after his appointment to the General Prosecutor’s Office, brought Kropiva on board (Kropiva had previously worked in the cyberpolice and the Odesa Regional State Administration), didn’t just know about these activities. Without his approval and support, it would have been physically impossible to launch such a “harassment campaign” against call centers on a nationwide scale. So the Prosecutor General wasn’t just aware—he was fully “in the loop.”

Empty envelopes and other evidence: what will prove the guilt of the OGP leadership

At the everyday level, it is clear to the public that the leadership of the Prosecutor General’s Office was “in the know and in on the scheme.” During searches at the Prosecutor General’s residence, empty envelopes were even seized, though these do not constitute evidence from a legal standpoint. The pretrial investigation authority is obligated to clearly prove the fact of receiving unlawful benefits, establish the exact amounts and their sources, and provide the court with irrefutable evidence—not merely empty envelopes, on which any indictment would collapse.

The activities of these call centers have expanded since the start of the full-scale invasion, often under the guise of “working against Russia” and supporting the military. The current intensification of efforts by anti-corruption agencies and the president’s public initiatives on September 2 to dismantle these networks indicate that the situation has reached the highest political level, where law enforcement agencies are finally being required to close this chapter of corruption.

“Carthage” Demands Convictions

The scale of Chancellor Kropiva’s enrichment is staggering. Court documents alone have revealed that enormous sums of money were involved: close relatives opened accounts holding millions, while property and real estate were purchased in the name of his “Muse,” Yelizaveta. The criminal scheme amounts to millions.

The investigation must determine the actual scale of the scheme and produce a substantive outcome. Then it will be a criminal-law resolution, rather than merely a political purge, as was the case when Kravchenko was ousted and the matter was closed. If the investigation was launched solely to remove the Prosecutor General—for whom the heads of anti-corruption agencies still harbor a particular “affection” following last year’s attack on the Anti-Corruption Bureau and votes on high-profile bills—then the line between criminal proceedings and politics will be completely blurred.

The investigation into Mudra and Mykytas has already entered an active phase. Preventive measures are being imposed on key suspects, and Mudra has been in custody for a month. However, don’t expect a quick resolution this fall: the proceedings will take a long time, and new intriguing developments will emerge, although law enforcement should be given the opportunity to work undisturbed without premature leaks of inside information.

The Muza Phenomenon: Suspicions of Money Laundering 

Formally, Yelyzaveta Ivakhnenko’s story appears to be a simple case of receiving expensive gifts. However, the nature of their conversations suggests that she was aware that the funds used for her travels, property, and car did not come from entirely “legitimate” sources. Furthermore, a sole proprietorship was registered in her name, through which cash was funneled into the civilian economy.

That said, it’s too early to talk about a trial—she has only been charged with aiding and abetting the legalization of illicit proceeds. Prosecutors will have their work cut out for them: they must prove not only the criminal origin of the funds but also that the woman had the specific intent to legalize them. So far, the court records do not indicate direct intent; the situation increasingly resembles that of a mistress.

Most likely, investigators are using coercive tactics to force a deal. During the hearing on her pretrial detention, Ivakhnenko personally stated that immediately after her arrest, the prosecutor pressured her to give testimony. Detectives are clearly counting on obtaining testimony against Kropiva and the former Prosecutor General, given their joint trips to Spain. The disproportionate bail of 20 million hryvnias also indicates an intent to “break” the suspect. The imbalance is obvious: a 24-year-old woman has been ordered to pay the same amount as high-profile figures like Mudra, while Stefaniishyna’s bail was set at only 6 million hryvnia. This exorbitant amount was chosen deliberately—to force Ivakhnenko to talk while she is in pretrial detention.

Why the authorities suddenly declared war on call centers

The synchrony of public statements and actions by anti-corruption officials in September appears fundamentally revealing. First, the president proposed an initiative to increase accountability for the activities of fraudulent call centers and introduced new bills; just two days later, NABU and the SAP launched a high-profile investigation into the “Carthage” case. This temporal overlap suggests a likely leak of information regarding the anti-corruption agencies’ preparations for the special operation. The government effectively took preemptive action to set the agenda and demonstrate to the public its unwavering determination to combat this industry.

The claim that call centers allegedly operate in the interests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine because they are “haunting” the Russian financial sector is a deliberate manipulation and an attempt to justify plain old profiteering. Over time, this industry shifted its focus to the European and American markets, as well as CIS countries. In other words, the scammers began targeting our international partners. Money has always been at the top of this pyramid, not aid to the army. Moreover, a significant portion of the embezzled corrupt funds—which were originally of Russian origin—was distributed for years to Ukrainian officials and security forces in the form of illicit benefits in exchange for allowing the scheme to operate unhindered.

The Degradation of the Prosecutor’s Office: A Hierarchy of Total Oppression

The current state of the prosecutor’s office reveals profound systemic degradation. Whereas previously, appointment to the Office of the Prosecutor General required at least five years of work experience in territorial and regional units to gain expertise, today, random individuals—who previously had questionable reputations in many institutions—are being appointed to leadership positions within the central apparatus. Instead of fulfilling their constitutional functions, officials have effectively turned the agency into a tool for coordinated “protection rackets” and extorting money from illegal businesses.

Evidence of total control over financial flows is the current practice whereby any searches planned by district or regional units throughout Ukraine must be reported in advance to the Office of the Prosecutor General. This is done solely to warn the “right” people and to monetize influence yet again. The dismantling of the investigative and general oversight functions under the guise of European reforms has not rid the system of corruption but has instead reduced the activities of law enforcement agencies to mere private enrichment.

The Crisis of Sectoral Governance

The main problem with the current power structure lies in its inability to publicly acknowledge its own personnel mistakes. Instead of appointing qualified specialists from within the sector who deeply understand its specifics, key positions have for years been filled based on personal loyalty or behind-the-scenes connections. Sectors should be managed by professionals: the energy sector by energy experts, healthcare by qualified medical professionals, and the prosecutor’s office by professional prosecutors. Instead, attempts to reform the law enforcement and judicial systems—which have been ongoing since 2014 with the participation of external activists lacking experience in actual state-building—have only led to a deepening of chaos and a loss of basic functionality.

The logic of appointing “one’s own” people without regard for their competence is nonsense that is unacceptable in areas critical to the state. No leadership would ever consider appointing a civilian journalist or prosecutor as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, since the army must be led by someone with a thorough understanding of military affairs. However, in the civilian and law enforcement sectors, the approach of “he’s one of us, so he’ll figure it out somehow” has become the norm. This points to a deep institutional crisis, where specialized expertise has been completely supplanted by loyalty and the desire of interim officials to cling to their posts. It also reflects the philosophy of these interim officials: to take office, enrich themselves as quickly as possible by amassing fortunes in the millions, and leave complete ruin in their wake. As a result, institutions are destroyed by the lack of a systemic vision, and each successive leader merely repeats the corrupt pattern of their predecessor.

A Call for Mature Dialogue: How to Emerge from an Existential Crisis

Society sees the reality of the situation and no longer accepts attempts to justify personnel failures. Against the backdrop of an existential threat and constant enemy attacks on civilian and military infrastructure, the government is obligated to engage in an honest, mature conversation with citizens. It is necessary to openly acknowledge the accumulated personnel mistakes, put an end to the practice of appointing ineffective loyalists, and bring in genuine experts to manage the country.

Society is prepared to tighten its belt fairly, but only on the condition that the rules are the same for everyone and that those in power refrain from profiting from the war. Maintaining the system under the dual pressure of external aggression and internal corruption is possible only through a return to honest governance, where strategic institutions are led by professionals capable of making responsible decisions.

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