Russia is losing about 300 soldiers killed in action every day
Data from the Russian Ministry of Finance show that in the first quarter of 2026, the Russian military signed 71,216 new contracts—the lowest figure in the past three years. At the same time, regional budget payments, according to analysts’ estimates, may indicate approximately 9,000 military casualties per month, or about 300 people per day.
According to calculations by Janis Klug — a German economist and research fellow at the Berlin-based Science and Politics Foundation (SWP) specializing in Russian military finance — the federal budget spent 28.5 billion rubles on bonuses for new recruits in January–March 2026. Since the signing bonus is 400,000 rubles, this means that during this period the army signed 71,216 contracts, or about 800 per day.
This is significantly less than in the first quarters of previous years:
Q1 2024 – 73,366 contracts;
Q1 2025 – 89,601 contracts;
Q1 2026 – 71,216 contracts.
In the second quarter, the pace picked up slightly – according to regional data, the army returned to approximately 1,000 contracts per day, or 30,000 per month. On April 30, Dmitry Medvedev stated that since the beginning of 2026, the army had signed 127,000 new contracts—1,058 per day. However, regional data showed a significantly lower figure—around 100,000. The discrepancy between official statements and budget data remains consistent—about 10%.
In parallel with the decline in recruitment, the analyst tracks payments to the families of the deceased from regional budgets. Data from 17 regions of the Russian Federation record payments for approximately 10,000 killed since the beginning of 2026. If extrapolated to all of Russia, this amounts to about 9,000 deaths per month—or 300 per day.
Kluge emphasizes: this is an estimate with a large margin of error, as the regional sample is small, and delays in payments complicate accurate calculations. However, even this figure confirms the overall picture: since January 2026, the Russian military has been suffering casualties faster than it can replenish its ranks.
Kluge considers two scenarios. The first—and more likely—is that Russia is indeed facing a recruitment shortage. This is indicated by record-high regional payments to recruits, which point to pressure to meet recruitment quotas, as well as numerous reports of forced recruitment in the regions.
The second scenario is less likely, but the analyst does not rule it out: if the total number of active Russian military personnel is still growing, the pressure on recruitment may ease on its own. In that case, Putin could theoretically even release some of those forcibly mobilized in 2022—for example, on the eve of the elections.
The main argument against this scenario is the steady increase in regional payments and numerous reports of forced conscription in some regions. The system is holding up for now, but signs of exhaustion are mounting, according to an analysis by Janis Klug in Russianomics.
Earlier, the General Staffreleased a map of combat operations in Ukraine as of June 5, 2026.
On June 4, the General Staff updated the map ofhostilities and recorded 279 clashes.
Earlier, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on drones with a range of up to 3,500 km.
Ukraine’s unmanned systems forces reported the destruction of two Tu-142 aircraft and an Iskander operational-tactical missile system at a military airfield in Taganrog, Russia.
