Russian footprint in Polish fintech: what lies behind the regulator’s sudden decision
A company from Tarnowskie Gory, supported by European Union grants, may have helped Russians circumvent the blockade imposed by the West on their country. We uncover what happened behind the scenes: the withdrawal of the licence from the Polish fintech Quicko, which, according to a whistleblower, became part of Russia’s sanctions-evasion machine. Against the backdrop of the decision by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), a stablecoin called A7A5 and a Kremlin-controlled bank come into focus.
On 21 January 2026, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) urgently revoked the licence of the national payment institution held by fintech company Quicko. This so-called “nuclear option” is used extremely rarely on the Polish market. Normally, such proceedings take months. This time, the regulator acted at lightning speed. Why?
In its official statement, the KNF said the decision was driven by a “lack of prudent and stable management”. According to our information, this concise wording may conceal (conscious or unconscious) links to a Russian payment system designed to circumvent international sanctions.
The development of Quicko’s infrastructure was financed in part with public funds. The company implemented a project titled “Implementation of an innovative system for servicing card and online payments” with a total value of PLN 1.35 million, of which PLN 800,000 was non-repayable funding from EU sources. According to the whistleblower who uncovered the case, this very system may have been used to bypass SWIFT.
Huawei watches and Netflix in Moscow?
The KNF’s decision to revoke Quicko’s licence affected, among others, Polish users of Huawei smartwatches who relied on contactless payments serviced by this fintech. In addition, the company provided services to many legally operating firms. At the same time, according to information obtained by us, Quicko’s client base may also have included an entity that allowed Russians to exchange roubles and purchase subscriptions to services blocked in their country, such as ChatGPT, Netflix, Google Cloud or Midjourney.
The whistleblower who submitted a report in this case to the Polish authorities was Andrii Lebedev, Director of the Estonian fintech Swipelux. As he explains, the story that eventually led him to Quicko began with a routine customer due-diligence procedure carried out at his company last year.
At that time, representatives of the A7A5 project approached Swipelux. Despite seemingly “clean” documentation, Lebedev’s compliance department rejected the client due to a suspicious structure and transaction volumes indicating possible links to the Russian government. The intuition of the Estonian experts was confirmed six months later, when the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) — the US Treasury body responsible for enforcing economic sanctions — officially sanctioned the project.
A Russian cryptocurrency designed to evade sanctions
A7A5 is a stablecoin (a cryptocurrency designed to maintain the value of a traditional currency), pegged to the Russian rouble. In less than a year since its launch in January 2025, it processed transactions worth more than USD 100 billion. According to analysts at Elliptic, the asset forms the backbone of an advanced Kremlin sanctions-evasion system.
The official issuer of A7A5 stablecoins is Old Vector LLC, registered in Kyrgyzstan. However, Elliptic researchers established that the project is in fact controlled by the Russian company A7 LLC, whose main shareholders are entities directly linked to the Russian state apparatus:
- Promsvyazbank (PSB) — a Russian state-owned bank servicing the defence sector and subject to full sanctions. The roubles backing the A7A5 stablecoin at a 1:1 ratio are held at PSB.
- Ilan Shor — a Moldovan oligarch convicted of financial fraud and sanctioned for activities carried out in Russia’s interests.
The purpose of A7A5 was to facilitate cross-border payments for Russian entities. In the second half of 2025, its creators launched the StablePay service as a new initiative to increase the usability of the stablecoin. The service operates through a simple mechanism:
1. a user tops up a virtual debit card with A7A5 tokens;
2. the funded card can then be used to pay for foreign services that have officially blocked access for users from the Russian Federation.
And this is where Quicko re-enters the story.
Dangerous links of a Polish fintech?
After rejecting the business proposal linked to A7A5 and following the imposition of sanctions on the project, Andrii Lebedev paid little attention to the matter for some time. Recently, however, out of curiosity, he decided to check whether the Russian stablecoin was still active.
“I was shocked to see them fully operational, advertising the ability to deposit and withdraw Russian roubles. I started asking myself: who is the provider enabling this? Who is ignoring US sanctions and actively cooperating with such a company? This search led me directly to Quicko,” Lebedev says.
In a recording provided to our newsroom, the whistleblower demonstrates step by step the process that led him to the company from Tarnowskie Góry. The StablePay system instructs users how to top up a card with cryptocurrency (for example, stablecoins) in order to make a payment in euros or dollars.
During the payment authorisation process (Mastercard ID Check), the logo of the entity LifeUp appears on the screen. This brand directly services the transaction on the user’s side, acting as a “front shop” — a mask intended to conceal the real beneficiary. On the LifeUp website, the footer contains information about the card-issuing bank (BIN provider). The tax identification number (NIP) listed there belongs to Quicko.
Quicko responds: “We do not operate in Russia”
We requested comment from the management of the Tarnowskie Góry-based company. In a written statement, CEO Grzegorz Mencel categorically rejected the allegations.
“The company has taken note of the KNF communication of 21 January 2026 and is analysing the current situation. We treated the KNF announcement with due seriousness and responsibility. Appropriate procedures have been launched in response. At the same time, we emphasise that users’ funds are secure and will be fully settled in accordance with KNF recommendations.
Any claims that Quicko’s infrastructure or cards were used on the territory of the Russian Federation or for the purpose of circumventing existing sanctions are untrue,” the statement sent to Bankier.pl reads.
It is worth noting that in the era of digital finance, sanctions violations do not necessarily involve a specific territory or deliberate intent to cooperate. They may result from insufficient due diligence of business partners (KYB). If a Polish fintech provided its infrastructure to the LifeUp brand without realising that it served as a front for the sanctioned A7A5 stablecoin, from a regulatory perspective this is no less serious.
We also requested comment and additional information from the Financial Supervision Authority and the General Inspector of Financial Information (GIIF). The KNF stated that it could not provide information beyond what was included in its official announcement. The GIIF declined to comment, citing financial secrecy.
Poland and Lithuania — a “back door” for Russian capital
According to Andrii Lebedev, the case described here may be part of a broader phenomenon. In professional circles, he says, it is an “open secret” that Polish financial intelligence units and licensing authorities struggle to enforce strict compliance checks compared with other jurisdictions. Another industry source confirmed to us that Polish authorities lack adequate tools to detect such offences.
“Many companies operating under Polish licences service payments for high-risk sectors, including illegal gambling, using so-called ‘miscoding’ (disguising the nature of transactions), and facilitate money laundering. Initially, I believed this problem was limited to Polish crypto companies (which in Poland are not licensed, only registered), but it turns out it also applies to payment institutions and EMIs such as Quicko,” Lebedev says.
He states bluntly that, in his view, the overall effectiveness of the current sanctions regime is close to zero.
“It is still far too easy to use stablecoins to move money out of Russia, because there are providers willing to exchange these tokens for euros or dollars without properly verifying the source of funds. Most of these providers come from Poland or Lithuania,” the Swipelux director stresses.
According to Lebedev, the reason lies in regulatory arbitrage. In Estonia or Germany, obtaining a licence costs around EUR 250,000, requires hiring local staff and passing a strict ‘fit and proper’ assessment lasting up to a year. This makes the cost of error extremely high and companies fear losing their licence.
By contrast, in Poland or Lithuania the process could be completed in a week for around EUR 5,000. In Lebedev’s view, this has created an environment conducive to shell companies, turning both countries into the path of least resistance for money laundering that supports Russia’s war machine.
“In this particular case, Quicko was used by Russian companies to operate as if sanctions simply did not exist. This allowed them to maintain a ‘business as usual’ model despite global restrictions. I am convinced this is not an isolated case — many more companies are likely operating in the same way below the radar,” Andrii Lebedev concludes.
