Former CIA officer describes changes in Russian intelligence methods
Former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officer Sean Viswesser described the structure and methods of the Russian Federation’s special services — an aggressor state — in the book “Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War.” In an ERR News article, commentator Harri Tiido noted that, according to Viswesser’s conclusion, Russian services are increasingly using disposable and unreliable sources, as sending career officers abroad and maintaining long-term agent networks has become more difficult.
Structure of the special services
Viswesser, who during his operational career worked mainly on Russia and the former USSR, writes that Russia’s Federal Security Service, the successor to the KGB, has significant influence in Russian society. In his assessment, the FSB has retained some foreign intelligence functions, especially in the so-called near abroad.
The author also includes the GRU — the intelligence directorate of the General Staff, involved in cyber operations and satellite intelligence — in Russia’s intelligence system. He characterizes the FSB as a structure of control, pressure, and surveillance that also monitors other security agencies. He calls counterintelligence — the Third Directorate — the service’s largest and most influential component.
In Viswesser’s view, corruption and nepotism remain problems for the FSB and Russian security structures in general. In his assessment, this affects service relations, career advancement, and the content of reports, as employees may provide leadership with information it wants to hear.
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Agents and methods of influence
Viswesser believes that technology and the ability to check a person’s background, including through social media, have significantly complicated the use of illegals abroad. In the 1990s, Russian foreign intelligence began using Russian citizens with dual citizenship who lived in other countries and had no ties to embassies or consulates. However, a lack of professional training made such agents more vulnerable to exposure.
The author also draws attention to the use of people he calls “useful idiots,” who may be motivated by personal ambitions, as well as to the growing role of hybrid methods. Among recruitment methods, he names pressure on tourists visiting Russia and the compromising of diplomats, including through “honey traps.”
According to Viswesser’s conclusion, Russian intelligence activity in the West has become more dangerous: it is increasingly directed at infrastructure and critical services and is accompanied by the spread of disinformation to destabilize societies. He also points to the impact of Russian operations on public opinion during the 2008 war in Georgia, events in Crimea and Donbas temporarily occupied by Russia in 2014, and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
