Columnist calls code a strategic security resource — Jerusalem Post
The Israeli outlet The Jerusalem Post published a column on the transformation of software code into one of states’ strategic resources. The author, whom the outlet describes as an expert in cybersecurity strategy and AI and data governance, argues that the key issue is not the origin of programmers but control over technologies, data, infrastructure, and the rules for using digital systems.
The article notes that software controls financial systems, biometric identification, telecommunications, energy grids, satellites, intelligence platforms, autonomous weapons, and artificial intelligence. According to the author, geopolitical competition increasingly depends on semiconductor production, control of cloud infrastructure, satellite constellations, cryptographic keys, and AI models.
Digital infrastructure and defense
The author refers to NATO’s digital strategy from January 2026, which identifies secure digital infrastructure, AI, Zero Trust architecture, post-quantum cryptography, and human-machine interaction as components of the Alliance’s future defense posture. The column describes digital transformation not only as modernization but also as a source of operational advantage.
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The text also mentions the 2026 assessment by the US intelligence community. According to the author’s account, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors linked to ransomware programs are seeking access to US government, private, and critical networks for espionage, disruption, or profit. The author cites a US assessment according to which North Korea partly financed weapons development through cryptocurrency theft, which reached approximately $2 billion in 2025.
Control rather than origin
The column emphasizes that software security should not be tied to the ethnic origin or citizenship of a developer. Instead, it proposes assessing who owns the organization, which jurisdiction applies, where data is transferred, who has access to the source code, whether the system can be independently verified, and whether a human can intervene in its operation.
The author believes that the response of democratic states should be systems that can be trusted: auditable software, secure development environments, verified supply chains, continuous security testing, human control over important AI decisions, and intelligence sharing among allies. At the same time, he warns that increased oversight should not stifle innovation, privacy, and scientific cooperation.
