Ukraine's strikes on oil refineries triggered a second wave of the gasoline crisis in Russia
In early August 2026, the gasoline situation in Russia took a sharp turn for the worse once again. Following a series of Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries, many regions of the country once again experienced fuel shortages, long lines at gas stations, and supply disruptions.
At the same time, this second wave of the crisis differs from the first. It barely affected some regions, while in others, the shortage continued uninterrupted following the problems in July.
According to Meduza, journalists analyzed nearly half a million reports from drivers on the “DeBENZ” service for the period from July 4 to August 23, 2026. The results were cross-referenced with data on attacks on Russian refineries, exchange-traded sales of gasoline and diesel, and information from banking services.
The “DeBENZ” service allows drivers to report whether a specific gas station has fuel, whether there is a line, and whether there are restrictions on gasoline sales.
In early July 2026, more than one million drivers used the service daily. However, since the data is based on user reports, deliberate manipulation is theoretically possible.
The Russian Ministry of Energy stated that such maps may contain inaccurate information. However, the developer of “DeBENZ” claimed that the system filters out suspicious reports. According to him, during one attack, more than 50,000 fake reports were removed from the map.
“Meduza” further verified the data using banking services. In total, journalists used 3.9 million records from T-Bank, Sberbank, and Alfa-Bank.
The results showed that reviews on “DeBENZ” correlated with actual purchases at gas stations: where users reported fuel availability, it was indeed purchased more often, and vice versa.
The worst situation during the first wave was observed on July 8–11. At that time, gasoline could be purchased without waiting in line at only 17–29% of the gas stations listed on the “DeBENZ” map.
On July 11, drivers reported lines at 55% of the stations where fuel was actually available.
By mid-July, the situation began to improve. Russian authorities allowed the sale of lower-grade gasoline, restricted exports, and increased imports.
According to Reuters, at least 60,000 metric tons of gasoline were shipped to Russia from India alone, and planned imports from various countries—primarily Belarus—were estimated at approximately 400,000 metric tons per month.
By July 20, gasoline was available without waiting in line at 33–43% of gas stations, and fuel was available at 63–71% of stations overall.
The data shows that during the first wave of the shortage, Moscow and St. Petersburg were in a privileged position.
At the height of the crisis on July 8–11, gasoline without a line was available at approximately 49–50% of Moscow’s gas stations and at 32–34% of St. Petersburg’s stations.
By comparison, the average figure across Russia was only 17–29%.
It is likely that limited fuel supplies were redirected to the largest cities, where the shortage had particular economic and political significance.
One of the most notable examples was the attack on the Perm oil refinery on July 30. Before the attack, gasoline was available without waiting in line at 45–49% of gas stations in the Perm Krai, but over the next five days, this figure dropped to just 30–42%.
After the attack on the plant in Orsk, the share of gas stations with fuel available without waiting in line dropped from 35% to 18%.
After the strike on Nizhnekamsk, the availability of gasoline without waiting in line fell from 49% to 24%.
Similar consequences were observed following the attacks on the Syzran Oil Refinery, “Gazprom Neftochim Salavat,” and the Saratov Oil Refinery.
At the same time, the Yaroslavl Region was an exception. After the attack on YANOS, the situation at local gas stations did not worsen but actually improved. It is likely that the strike did not affect the plant’s main production and shipping facilities.
After a brief improvement, the situation began to deteriorate again. From July 25 to August 20, Ukrainian drones attacked Russian refineries 15 times, with some facilities suffering repeated strikes.
Facilities in Tyumen, Ryazan, Perm, Volgograd, Ufa, Syzran, Yaroslavl, Ilsk, Nizhnekamsk, Orsk, and Salavat were targeted.
From August 11–13, gasoline was available without waiting in line at only 25–33% of gas stations, and when stations with lines were included, the figure rose to 46–48%.
Thus, in terms of overall fuel availability, the August slump turned out to be even more severe than that of July.
A separate comparison of 2,176 identical gas stations showed that at the end of July, gasoline without lines was available at 46% of stations, whereas in mid-August—only at 32%. Taking lines into account, the figure dropped from 61% to 47%.
By August 23, the situation had improved somewhat: the figures rose to 38–46% and 63–75%, respectively. However, it remains unclear whether this improvement will be sustainable.
During the second wave, St. Petersburg remained one of the best-supplied regions. On August 21–23, gasoline without a line was available at approximately 81% of stations, and taking lines into account, at 86%.
In contrast, the second wave had a much more significant impact in Moscow and the Moscow Region.
In Moscow, at the same gas stations, the percentage of stations with gasoline available without a line dropped from 75% to 30%, and when lines were factored in, from 85% to 49%.
In the Moscow region, the corresponding figures fell from 72% to 25% and from 78% to 44%.
In the first half of August, gas without a line was available only at:
- 13–19% of gas stations in the Smolensk region;
- 16–25% in the Tambov region;
- 14–22% of gas stations in the Lipetsk region;
- 13–25% of gas stations in the Voronezh region;
- 6–24% of gas stations in the Ryazan Oblast.
The situation has worsened particularly in the Kurgan region, where fuel was available without a line at only 8–19% of stations.
Even with lines, gasoline was available at less than half of the gas stations in these regions—at 26–46% of stations.
Outside of Central Russia, the situation remained difficult in the Arkhangelsk and Samara regions. In the first half of August, gasoline without a line could be found there at only 5–20% and 16–26% of gas stations, respectively.
During the first three weeks of July, the price of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline in Russia rose by about five rubles per liter.
From June 29 to July 20, the average price of AI-92 rose from 69 to 73.5 rubles, and AI-95 from 74 to 79 rubles.
Prices rose particularly sharply in occupied Crimea and Sevastopol. According to Rosstat, from July 6 to July 20, the average price of gasoline in Crimea rose from 154 to 222 rubles per liter, and in Sevastopol—from approximately 133 to 211 rubles.
Due to the shortage, gasoline sales to the general public were completely suspended for a time, with fuel reserved for government services and critical needs. Meanwhile, scalpers were charging 200–350 rubles per liter.
From August 7–14, an average of about 78,000 metric tons of gasoline and diesel combined were sold daily on the exchange, of which approximately 16,000 metric tons were gasoline.
From August 17–20, the total volume fell to about 73,000 metric tons per day, although gasoline sales rose slightly to about 18,000 metric tons.
At the same time, supply remains significantly lower than last year’s. In June 2026, average gasoline sales were 29,000 metric tons per day, compared with 42,000 in 2025; in July, 20,000 versus 41,000; and from August 1 to 20—18,000 versus 40,000 metric tons.
In other words, gasoline sales in August were approximately 55% lower than last year’s.
Overall, the data indicates that after a brief improvement, the Russian fuel system has once again begun to struggle with the shortage.
After August 20, the situation stabilized somewhat, but it is too early to say that the crisis is over.
In the fall, the situation may become even more complicated due to a seasonal increase in demand and scheduled maintenance at major refineries in Russia and Belarus. Belarus is currently helping Russia compensate for the fuel shortage.
Since the beginning of 2026, Ukrainian drones and long-range missiles have damaged at least 28 of approximately 48 Russian oil refineries, according to estimates by French OSINT analyst Clément Molin. In total, he recorded 81 strikes on refineries, with 17 of Russia’s 20 largest refineries having been targeted.
The NORSI (Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez) refinery, which ranks fourth in Russia in terms of oil processing volume and second in gasoline production, suspended operations following an attack by Ukrainian drones.
In addition, Russia has reached an agreement with Kazakhstan to refine Russian oil at the local “Kondensat” refinery amid fuel shortages and reduced operations at its own oil refineries. Up to 70% of the gasoline and diesel fuel produced is planned to be returned to Russia, while the remainder will remain on the Kazakh market.
